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MICHIGAN APPELLATE COURT DETERMINES THAT AN EEOC “RIGHT TO SUE” 
LETTER IS NOT NECESSARY TO INITIATE ARBITRATION ON TITLE VII CLAIMS  
By 
Nick Fox* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Joseph Chevrolet, Inc. v. Hunt1, the Court of Appeals of Michigan 
considered an appeal from a defendant-petitioner for reversal of the trial court’s 
decision to vacate an arbitral award.2 After prevailing in arbitration, defendant’s 
arbitration award was vacated on grounds that she did not properly exhaust all 
administrative remedies before she initiated arbitration.3 The Court of Appeals 
reviewed the facts and ruled that it was unnecessary to obtain an Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) determination prior to initiating 
arbitration because it was widely acknowledged that the law was unsettled on this 
topic.4  
 
II. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner, Lori Hunt had been employed by Respondent, Joseph 
Chevrolet.5 Hunt alleged that she suffered adverse consequences at work after 
refusing to continue a sexual relationship with respondent Joseph Hood.6 Hunt 
subsequently filed a four-count demand for arbitration with the American 
Arbitration Association.7 She specifically claimed retaliation and sexual 
                                                 
*Nick Fox is a 2012 Juris Doctor candidate at the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson 
School of Law. 
1 Joseph Chevrolet, Inc. v. Hunt, No. 290882, 2010 WL 2292010 at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 
June 8, 2010), cert. denied, 790 N.W.2d 404 (Mich. 2010). 
2 Id.  
3 Id. at *4. 
4 Id. at *5. 
5 Id. at *4. 
6 Joseph Chevrolet, 2010 WL 2292010 at *4. 
7 Id. at *1 n.1. 
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harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Michigan’s Civil 
Rights Act (“CRA”).8  
Arbitration subsequently commenced, and on August 3, 2007, the 
arbitrators issued an award favoring Hunt.9 She was awarded $168,000 in damages 
for both back pay and mental anguish.10 Additionally, Hunt received $270,000 in 
attorney’s fees and $26,730 in costs.11 Her total award amounted to $464,730.12  
Shortly thereafter, Joseph Chevrolet moved to vacate the award of 
attorney’s fees and costs.13 The damages award of $168,000 was not contested.14 
After several motions from the parties, a hearing was held, and the trial court took 
the matter under advisement.15 The trial court subsequently issued its opinion, 
which vacated the arbitrator’s award for attorney’s fees and costs.16 Hunt moved 
for reconsideration but the court denied her motion.17 
Seeking a reversal of the trial court’s decision, Hunt then appealed the 
matter to the Court of Appeals of Michigan.18 She sought reinstatement of the 
arbitral award for fees and costs. Hunt argued that the trial court erred by both 
vacating the arbitration award, and by overturning the arbitrator’s determination 
that an award of attorney’s fees to Joseph Chevrolet was improper.19  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Id.; See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000h-c (2006), and 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.101-37.2901 (2001).  
9 Joseph Chevrolet, 2010 WL 2292010 at *1. 
10 Id. at *3. 
11 Id. at *1. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Joseph Chevrolet, 2010 WL 2292010 at *1 n.1. 
15 Id. at *1. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Joseph Chevrolet, 2010 WL 2292010 at *1, *4. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
 
The Appellate Court reviewed the trial court’s ruling de novo.20 The court 
determined that since the parties’ agreement to arbitrate allowed for a court 
judgment to be entered on the arbitration award, the State considered it “statutory 
arbitration."21 Pursuant to a Michigan Court Rule governing statutory arbitration, 
the court noted that  
 
a trial court may only vacate an arbitration award if one of 
the following occurs: (a) the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (b) there was 
evident partiality by an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, 
corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing a 
party’s rights; (c) the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers; 
or (d) the arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a 
showing of sufficient cause, refused to hear evidence 
material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the 
hearing to prejudice substantially a party’s rights.22  
 
The appellate court stated that the issue upon review was whether or not the 
arbitrator exceeded his powers by acting in contravention of controlling principles 
of law.23 The court noted that a trial court can only vacate an arbitrator’s award if 
an obvious, facial error exists. “A trial court may not hunt for errors in an 
arbitrator’s explanation of how it determined [liability] and [damages].”24 
                                                 
20 Id. at *1. 
21 Id. (citing Gordon Sel-Way v. Spence Bros. Inc., 438 Mich. 488, 495 (Mich. 1991)). 
22 Id. (quoting MI. RULES MCR § 3.602(J)(2)). 
23 Id. at *2.  
24 Joseph Chevrolet, 2010 WL 2292010 at *2 (quoting Saveski v. Tiseo Architects, Inc., 
261 Mich. App. 553, 558 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)); see also Gordon Sel-Way, 438 Mich. at 
495. 
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 The trial court vacated the arbitration award of attorney’s fees and costs 
based on their determination that the arbitrator exceeded his power when he 
awarded $270,000 to Hunt and $0 to Joseph Chevrolet.25 According to the trial 
court, the award was not reasonable given the circumstances of the case.26 
Specifically, the arbitrator reasoned that the contingent fee arrangement between 
Hunt and her attorneys would be insufficient to compensate the attorneys since the 
bulk of the relief sought was injunctive.27 The trial court rejected this reasoning, 
however, and suggested that the lawyer’s contingent fee based on the damages 
award of $168,000 alone would be sufficient compensation.28 The appellate court 
determined that the trial court had improperly set aside the arbitration award 
because it simply disagreed with the arbitrator’s determination of an appropriate 
amount for attorney’s fees.29 “Whether the trial court would have decided the issue 
differently is irrelevant because reviewing courts may not substitute their judgment 
for that of the arbitrator.”30 The court concluded that no facial error in the arbitral 
award existed, and accordingly, that the award was conveyed within the 
arbitrator’s expressly granted powers.31 
 The arbitrator’s denial of attorney’s fees for Joseph Chevrolet was based 
on the premise that respondent was meritorious in three of the four claims 
presented.32 The arbitrator determined that the preparation efforts and costs would 
not have been significantly different had Hunt omitted the claims that she 
ultimately lost.33 Additionally, the arbitrator determined that Hunt took a proper 
                                                 
25 Joseph Chevrolet, 2010 WL 2292010 at *3. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at *4. 
30 Joseph Chevrolet, 2010 WL 2292010 at *3 (citing Gordon Sel-Way v. Spence Bros. Inc., 
438 Mich. 488, 497 (Mich. 1991)).  
31 Id. at *4. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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approach in pursuing her Title VII claims via arbitration.34 Both parties conceded 
that it was unclear whether or not the filing of an EEOC complaint was mandatory 
prior to initiating arbitration.35 The trial court, however, asserted that it was 
entirely improper for Hunt to pursue judicial relief, without first filing a complaint 
with the EEOC or acquiring a “right to sue” letter.36 The trial court summarized 
Hunt’s omission as amounting to a frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless pursuit 
of litigation.37 
 A principal issue in this case was whether a party needs to obtain a right to 
sue letter from the EEOC before initiating arbitration. It is well settled that such a 
letter is required before commencing litigation on Title VII claims.38 Both parties, 
however, conceded that it was unclear whether or not obtaining such a letter was 
mandatory prior to initiating arbitration.39 Since the area of law is quite unsettled, 
the appellate court sided with the arbitrator in finding that Hunt’s conduct was not 
frivolous when she failed to obtain the letter.40 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the arbitrator’s decision was not an error of law, and reversed the 
decision of the trial court.41 The Court of Appeals deemed the trial court in error, 
and ultimately reinstated the decision of the arbitrator.42  
                                                 
34 Id. 
35 Joseph Chevrolet, 2010 WL 2292010 at *4. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at *5. 
39 Id. at *4. 
40Joseph Chevrolet, 2010 WL 2292010 at*4; see Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1978) (affirming district court’s 
denial of attorney fees when the district court concluded that a suit brought by EEOC under 
Title VII could not be characterized as unreasonable or meritless because “the basis upon 
which petitioner prevailed was an issue of first impression requiring judicial resolution”); 
see also Ross v. Auto Club Group, 748 N.W.2d 552 (Mich. 2008) (holding that insured was 
not entitled to attorney fees when insurer’s refusal to pay was a reasonable position 
considering the insured claim was an issue of first impression); Harbour v. Corr. Med. 
Serv., Inc., 266 Mich. App. 452, 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that a case involving a 
legal issue of first impression provides an exemption for awarding attorney fees under the 
case evaluation attorney fee provision). 
41 Joseph Chevrolet, 2010 WL 2292010 at *5. 
42 Id. 
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IV. SIGNIFICANCE  
 
 Joseph Chevrolet is significant because it establishes a precedent for all 
would-be Title VII litigants to follow – at least for the time being. Until a case is 
decided that demands exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to enacting 
arbitration, future Michigan plaintiffs may proceed to arbitration on the coattails of 
Joseph Chevrolet with a certain degree of confidence. However, if arbitration is 
intended to be a comparable, yet streamlined alternative to litigation, it would not 
be surprising to see a mandatory EEOC authorization as a gateway to Title VII 
arbitration in the future. 
 
